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Abstract 
Despite the increasing volume of trade between China and African countries, not one single 
conventional free trade agreement (FTA) or economic partnership agreement (EPA) has yet been 
signed between an African country and China. Initially, Sino-African trade relations were to a very 
large extent centred on investments secured through bilateral investment agreements (BITs). The 
more recent Chinese investments on the African continent, however, are more informally based on 
FDI contracts with the state at the receiving end and a government-owned private company as the 
investor, or loosely attached to loans commonly known under term ‘the Angola-Model’. This rather 
unusual basis for economic integration and development assistance, outside the trodden path of 
free trade agreements and ODA, requires further analysis in order to understand how the current 
legal framework between China and the African continent impacts economic development and 
national sovereignty, and what kind of distributive consequences it may have. 
 
It is generally agreed that moving up the path of value added production is one possible way to 
achieve sustainable economic growth, and that African countries tend to lag far behind in this 
respect. Keys to the emergence of value-added chains are, among others, reliable infrastructure and 
access to high-quality services. Thus, trade in infrastructural and other services is highly relevant to 
policies aiming at promoting value added production. As such it is worthwhile analysing the Chinese 
loans to African governments mentioned above in relation to their impact on the services sector, as s
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these loans are essentially intended for infrastructural investments and services trade (particularly 
telecommunication and transportation). Furthermore, contrary to trade liberalisation in goods, Sino-
African trade in services might bring more advantages than threats to the African economies by 
rendering urgently needed basic services accessible to everyone. 
 
In this context, this paper will first attempt to define the general legal character of contracts between 
African governments, Chinese companies and the China Exim Bank based on the Angola-Model. It 
will qualify to what extent the mutual legal obligations are of public or of private nature, and explain 
the respective legal consequences. 
 
The core of the paper will discuss the extent to which the kind of Sino-African services trade 
currently in place may foster or hinder the emergence and growth of value addition on the African 
continent. In doing so, the paper will focus on the impact of the recent loan-attached Sino-African 
infrastructural services trade, as the latter has proven to be an essential aid-for-trade ingredient for 
value added chain creation and growth. In this context, the paper will benchmark the current 
achievements of this quite unique partnership between African countries and China with the range of 
possibilities granted by GATS and the potential advantages slumbering in a Sino-African FTA in 
services. It will highlight if, where and how African governments could improve the impact on local 
value added activities by taking advantage of the respective policy space attached to each legal 
instrument regulating South-South services trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
Charlotte Sieber-Gasser, MLaw (University of Bern), MA Development Studies (University of 
Manchester), PhD candidate in law, University of Bern. This paper is written in the context of the 
research project ‘South-South Regional Trade Agreements in Services’, funded by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation (SNSF) National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) Trade 
Regulation.  
 
Research for this paper was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation under a grant to the 
National Centre of Competence in Research on Trade Regulation, based at the University of Bern’s 
World Trade Institute in Bern, Switzerland. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is focusing on the services aspect of the Sino-African economic cooperation. It is 
based on the literature centred on the crucial role of services in the creation of value-added 
chains: Every value-added chain requires reliable and cheap transportation (to move the 
commodities and semi-finished goods from one place of production to the next), reliable and 
cheap telecommunication (to organise the production, manage the value-added chain), access 
to finance (to build production sights, keep processes up to date), and access to specialist 
knowledge1. These basic services provide the soil for value-added production, and are the 
imminent link between commodity and final product.  
 
China has identified infrastructure and the services sector long ago as an important aspect for 
economic development. Today, the services sector in China is growing strongly and capable 
of providing the basis for value-added production2. Most of Africa, however, lags far behind 
in the development of their infrastructure and services sector. With the exception of a few 
countries, the African services sector is roughly described as weak and fragmented3. It is, 
thus, not surprising that while China’s economy consists of a multitude of different value-
added chains that process raw materials into internationally tradable goods, African 
economies are still to a very large extent depending on the export of commodities4. 
 
                                                 
1 cf. CHAUDHURI, S. AND KARMAKAR, S. (2008) ‘The Liberalisation of Cross-Border Trade in Services: A 
Developing Country Perspective’, In: J. A. Marchetti and M. Roy (eds.), Opening Markets for Trade in 
Services: Countries and Sectors in Bilateral and WTO Negotiations, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; HOEKMAN, B. AND MATTOO, A. (2007) Services Trade and Growth, Paper prepared for a 
meeting of the Commission on Growth and Development, World Bank, Washington DC; and 
WHALLEY, J. (2003) Assessing the Benefits to Developing Countries of Liberalisation in Services Trade, 
Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research NBER, Cambridge MA. 
2 cf. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (2005), Unlocking China’s Services Sector, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Economic Analytical Unit, Adcorp, Canberra. 
3 cf. COLLIER, P. AND GUNNING, J. W. (1999), ‘Why has Africa Grown Slowly?’, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 3-22. 
4 cf. Ibid. 
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However, part of China’s official aid policy is to support African countries in developing 
their infrastructure and services sectors. The reasoning behind the Chinese aid policy is based 
on China’s own development experience, in which services and infrastructure were identified 
as key aspects5. Thus, China’s support of African economies is directed at infrastructure 
projects and the development of services sectors, both financially and on the ground. 
 
The aim of this paper is to qualify the legal character of the Chinese engagement in African 
infrastructure projects and services sectors. The Chinese involvement is often based on state 
loans provided by the Chinese Exim bank6 in return for oil or other commodities, and it is 
fairly unknown what legal rights and duties are attached to these kinds of agreements. 
Outlining possible implications of the legal character of the contracts based on this so-called 
Angola-Model provides the basis for a discussion on the policy-space in the Sino-African 
economic relationship and on more fundamental, systemic questions concerning the structure 
of international economic law. 
 
 
2. Legal Characterisation of the Sino-African Economic Relationship 
Legal characterisation has been defined as ‘the intellectual operation that consists in 
classifying a fact, an action, an institution or a specific legal relationship in order to apply the 
relevant legal regime to it’7. It is the legal regime relevant in the case of Chinese engagement 
in African infrastructure projects that decides upon legal rights and duties, and consequently 
upon the room for negotiations.  
                                                 
5 cf. PANNELL, C. W. (2008), ‘China’s Economic and Political Penetration in Africa’, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 706-730. 
6 See [Online]: http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/businessarticle/activities/loan/200905/9398_1.html [Accessed: 4 
November 2010]. 
7 PAASIVIRTA, E. (1990), Participation of States in International Contracts, Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, Finnish 
Lawyers’ Publishing Company, Helsinki, p. 94. 
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However, the agreements attached to Chinese investments into the African infrastructure and 
services sector are not publicly available. Therefore, this chapter attempts to narrow down the 
legal character of these agreements based on what is publicly available and by outlining the 
implications of the different legal options. To be very concise in the legal characterisation of 
Sino-African investment treaties, one would need to have access to both the minutes of the 
negotiating-process and the actual treaty-texts. 
 
2.1 Sino-African State Trading Based on the Barter System: The Case of Angola 
While China respects national sovereignty and pursues a strict non-interference policy in 
relation to internal conflicts and human rights abuses8, it is also willing to find alternative 
payment arrangements, such as Barter or technology transfers9. This makes China a very 
attractive partner in economic cooperation for the financially poor but commodity rich 
African governments. In some cases China is the only remaining partner in economic 
cooperation when the rest of the world decided to boycott a specific government on the 
grounds of moral or ethical objections10. 
 
Trading based on the Barter system has a long history on the African continent and is still 
prevalent11. Chinese officials, thus, seem to have found a common language with African 
governments when negotiating over commodity backed state loans. While Western countries 
and companies will expect hard currency in return for their investments or loans12, the 
                                                 
8 cf. DAVIES, M. (2008), How China delivers Development Assistance to Africa, Centre for Chinese Studies, 
University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, p. 57. 
9 BITZINGER, R. A. (1992), ‘Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World’, International Security, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 
84-111, p. 92. 
10 Recent examples would be Angola, Sudan, or Zimbabwe. 
11 cf. AZARYA, V. AND CHAZAN, N. (1987), ‘ Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the 
Experience of Ghana and Guinea’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 106-131, p. 
117 and p. 127. 
12 cf. TEUNISSEN, J. J. (2005), ‘Clichés, Realities and Policy Challenges of Africa: By Way of Introduction’, In: 
J. J. Teunissen and A. Akkerman (eds.), Africa in the World Economy: The National, Regional and 
International Challenges, Fondad, The Hague, pp. 1-22. 
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Chinese officials are happy to accept alternative ways of payment. At first glance, this 
approach seems to meet very nicely the Chinese interest in commodity supply, as well as the 
African interest in access to finance and strengthening of the economic infrastructure13. 
 
These resource-backed financing agreements in Africa have become known as the ‘Angola 
Model’14. The term is derived from the long history of Chinese investment in Angola. The 
model describes the typical concessional loan to African governments, of which the China 
Exim Bank is the sole lender. Such loans are given for infrastructure, social or industrial 
projects for which Chinese contractors must be awarded and in principle no less than 50 
percent of the projects’ procurement must come from China. The projects are determined by 
the local government15. In exchange for the loan, China typically secures oil or other 
commodities as collateral16. The structure of the Angola-Model can be described like this17: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source World Bank (2008). 
                                                 
13 cf. PANNELL, C. W. (2008), ‘China’s Economic and Political Penetration in Africa’, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 706-730, p. 711. 
14 DAVIES, M. (2008), p. 53. 
15 See China Exim Bank [Online]: http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/businessarticle/activities/loan/ 
200905/9398_1.html [Accessed: 4 November 2010]. 
16 DAVIES, M. (2008), p. 53-4. 
17 FOSTER, V., BUTTERFIELD, W., CHEN, C. AND PUSHAK, N. (2008), Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as 
Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa, The World Bank, Washington DC, p. 43. 
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In relation to the legal characterisation, the extraordinary aspect of these contracts is the fact 
that the loans are only indirectly provided by the China Exim Bank by paying the Chinese 
company for accomplishing the projects agreed to by an African government.  
 
Typically, state loans are based on a contract between two subjects of public law and, thus, 
part of public international law. In the case of the Sino-African loans under the Angola-
Model, at first sight the contracts attached to the state loans are part of private law, because 
the Chinese company as the final receiver of the loan is not a subject of public law. However, 
this is disputed: 
The ability of Chinese firms to invest in fragile states – such as Angola, the DRC, 
Sudan and Sierra Leone – is almost certainly linked to the political economy of the 
Chinese corporate sector. Many Chinese firms investing [in Africa] are partly or 
wholly state-owned, and reflect the desire of the Chinese government to build a long-
term presence in a resource-rich continent.18  
Thus, it could be argued that the fact that the China Exim Bank is wholly state-owned, acts in 
the interest and on behalf of the Chinese government, and deals with a Chinese company 
working in Africa arguably in the interest of the Chinese and the African governments, too, 
accounts for de facto public character of the contracts: the contracts are basically part of an 
agreement between two subjects of public international law, the African state and China. 
 
2.2 Review past Debates: Public or Private International Law? 
As mentioned earlier above, it is impossible to conduct a thorough analysis of the legal 
character of Sino-African investments in the infrastructural sector due to a lack of 
information about the actual content of the agreements. However, similar problems have been 
discussed before and might inform the debate in this context. 
                                                 
18 KAPLINSKY, R., MCCORMICK, D. AND MORRIS, M. (2007), The Impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa, 
working paper, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, p. 41. 
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With globalisation and the emergence of giant MNCs, new global players joined the circle of 
nation states: corporations richer than many countries and highly influential on the stage of 
international politics. This led to a debate about the legal character of MNCs as they were 
quite clearly object of public international law and often also acting like a subject of public 
international law, but they were not bound to the rules of public international law. 
Consequently, their actions were attributed to the sphere of private international law although 
they often had a very public character19. 
 
When in the late 70ies and early 80ies the rising MNCs began to invest in developing 
countries in return for oil-concessions, the term ‘economic development agreement’ was 
developed. An economic development agreement was defined as: 
Their subject matter is particularly broad: they are not concerned only with an 
isolated purchase or performance, but tend to bring to developing countries 
investments and technical assistance, particularly in the field of research and 
exploitation of mineral resources, or in the construction of factories on a turnkey 
basis.20 [It] is a broad term for agreements covering direct investment, which 
characterises the role of the investment, the term implying mutuality of obligation. 
It’s a collaboration of a special type, which cannot reasonably be included in the 
orbit of some particular internal law. They are viewed as a genus tertius between 
treaties and contracts21. 
The Sino-African investments based on the Angola-Model correspond more or less with these 
early so-called economic development agreements. Although today’s Sino-African 
investments are more sophisticated and bundle more obligations and concessions together, 
the basic approach is the same: development assistance in return for economic benefits. 
                                                 
19 On the relationship between foreign policy and corporate interests: ALDEN, C. AND DAVIES, M. (2006), ‚A 
Profile of the Operations of Chinese Multinationals in Africa’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 
vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 83-96, p. 85. 
20 PAASIVIRTA, E. (1990), p. 96. 
21 PAASIVIRTA, E. (1990), p. 95. 
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It has been argued that if the contract is an ‘economic development agreement’, then it’s due 
to its nature rooted in the international legal system22. Such an agreement aims at securing 
national interests and deals with the rights and obligations of a public good (e.g. resources). 
Thus, the body of international law was criticised for its restriction to relations between states 
claiming that this restriction may be seen as normative, and that it was clear that 
‘contemporary international law is not exclusively restricted to relations between States, but 
extends increasingly to individuals and other non-State entities’23. 
 
However, this viewpoint did not become widely accepted, because there was not enough 
evidence substantiating the public character of the contracts between the governments of 
developing countries and MNCs. Also, lifting the legal status of MNCs up to the level of a 
nation state seemed too far-fetched and not reasonable24.  
 
In contrast, the circumstances are somewhat different in the case of Sino-African investment 
agreements: While Northern MNCs clearly are a subject of private law and are neither 
controlled nor owned by a government, the Chinese MNCs are usually wholly state-owned 
and –controlled. In the particular case of the China Exim Bank, such control and ownership is 
official. Thus, the contracting party vis-à-vis the African government is not acting like a 
subject of private law, but like a subject of private law de facto doing the job which 
elsewhere the minister of finance or international economic relations, a subject of public law, 
would do.  
 
                                                 
22 PAASIVIRTA, E. (1990), p. 93. 
23 PAASIVIRTA, E. (1990), p. 67. 
24 For an illustration of the problem see: THOMPSON, G. (2006), Tracking Global Corporate Citizenship: Some 
Reflection on ‚Lovesick’ Companies, Discussion Paper, Institute for International Integration Studies, Trinity 
College Dublin, Dublin, p. 13. 
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The main arguments against the public character of the economic development agreements 
do, thus, not apply to the case of Sino-African investment agreements. Therefore, reviewing 
the debate about the public or private character of such contracts in the specific case of China 
would be worthwhile as the outcome might turn out to be quite the opposite: the Sino-African 
investment contracts might turn out to be an ordinary treaty between two states. 
 
2.3 The Implications of Private International Law on the Angola-Model 
If the Chinese company receiving paid by the loan was beyond doubt acting as a subject of 
private law, independent from the Chinese government’s interests, it could be argued that the 
Bank’s contracts based on the Angola-Model would fall under the umbrella of private law. 
The law applying to the contract is, thus, due to its international nature depending on the rules 
of the relevant conflict of laws (private international law). 
 
In private international law, the contracting parties can choose the governing law of the 
contract. This is based on the principle of freedom of choice of law, probably the most well 
known rule of private international law. In absence of a choice of law, a relevant tribunal may 
determine the governing law. Usually, the choice of law is that of the host country. In our 
case, this means that the law of the respective African country is applied to the contract. 
However, it is quite common to de-localise the governing law by replacing the law of the host 
country with a reference to ‘the general principles of law’25.  
 
As the contracts negotiated by the China Exim Bank, African governments and Chinese 
companies are not publicly available; the choice of law in contracts related to the Angola 
Model is unknown. It can generally be said that it is to the advantage of the host country if its 
                                                 
25 PAASIVIRTA, E. (1990), p. 56. 
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own law is chosen. Also, the reference to the general principles of law allows for more 
flexibility in the content and in the governing of the contract as they require interpretation 
and are less specific. It would, therefore, be rather to the advantage of the China Exim Bank 
and the Chinese companies, if the contracting parties agreed to choose only to refer to the 
general principles of law. 
 
In private international law, the contracting parties cannot only choose the governing law, but 
also the forum for dispute-settlement26. In the case of choice of forum, more or less the same 
is true as has been said before: solving a dispute before the courts of the host country tends to 
be to the advantage of the host country, choosing any other forum is generally in the interest 
of the other contracting party. 
 
Generally, if the contract falls under the umbrella of private international law, one national 
law or the general principles of law govern the contract. This means that the only limitations 
to the content of the agreement stem from the governing law. This law also decides upon the 
consequences of a breach of contract, which will be treated just like any other breach of 
contract. In addition, the legal protection of investments and properties based on a contract of 
private international law tends to be stronger, because bilateral or multilateral investment 
protection agreements on the state-level will provide for additional protection27. 
 
2.4 The Implications of Public International Law on the Angola-Model 
If – what is more likely to be the case here – the contracts between the China Exim Bank, 
African governments and Chinese companies fall in fact under the governmental framework 
                                                 
26 See relevant rules of applying Conflict of Laws (private international law). 
27 See relevant national legislation. China has investment protection agreements with most of the African 
countries. 
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agreement of a loan based on the Angola-Model, the contracts would be governed by public 
international law, too. 
 
In public international law, all ratified conventions and international agreements, particularly 
also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the body of international 
economic law, the principles of public international law and ius cogens are relevant for a 
treaty between two states. The content of the Chinese contract with the African government 
based on the Angola-Model is, thus, directly restricted by the rules and norms of public 
international law.  
 
Although this restriction of the content is in the particular case of contracts based on the 
Angola-Model not directly match-making, it is so indirectly: The two states are allowed to 
negotiate any kind of deal as long as it does not violate ius cogens28. The violation of other 
obligations of public international law would naturally have consequences, too.  
 
Generally, it is not known whether or not the contracts based on the Angola Model are 
consistent with public international law up to every detail. Concerns have been raised 
particularly in reference to human rights, labour and environmental standards, thus, it would 
at least be worthwhile to remain cautious until such a contract is actually examined 
properly29.  
 
Furthermore, it is not known if in some cases the contracts based on the Angola-Model 
amount to a kind of de facto preferential access to the African market for Chinese companies. 
                                                 
28 cf. Art. 53 VCLT. 
29 Chinese companies on the African continent have repeatedly been criticised for ignoring labour standards, 
polluting and not respecting standards for the protection of the environment, and for violating human rights 
standards. However, it has to be noted that these issues are not restricted to Chinese companies, but are a matter 
of concern in relation to MNCs in general. 
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If that would be the case, a number of norms and principles of international economic law 
would be relevant for the legal examination of the contracts: the requirements for PTAs of 
both GATS and GATT and the principle of MFN30. In order to achieve transparency, a 
concerned third country could consequently appeal against the contracting of Chinese 
companies based on the Angola-Model in front of the WTO dispute settlement body31. 
 
Finally, it remains open whether or not the contracts meet the formal requirements for state 
treaties imposed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In particular, the 
following Norms are of interest in the context of the Angola-Model based loan agreements: 
observance of obligations independently from a treaty (VCLT 43), absence of consent 
procured through corruption (VCLT 50), fundamental change of circumstances (VCLT 62), 
registration and publication of treaties (VCLT 80), and the norms on the conclusion and entry 
into force of treaties (VCLT Part II).  
 
In addition, due to the public nature of such a contract, the consequences of a breach of 
contract are different to the ones in private law (VCLT 60)32. A potential breach of contract 
would not be brought to a national court, but would typically have to be solved through 
additional negotiations and measures between the parties or in front of a dispute settlement 
body. Lastly, the fact that such a contract would fall under public international law weakens 
the legal protection of investments and properties, as a consequence of the hierarchy of the 
relevant legal texts33. 
 
 
                                                 
30 GATS II and GATS V, GATT I and GATT XXIV. 
31 cf. GATT XXIII and Agreement on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 
32 See also literature on state responsibility, e.g. DOMINICÉ, C. (1999), ‘The International Responsibility of 
States for Breach of Multilateral Obligations’, EJIL, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 353-363. 
33 cf. KOSKENNIEMI, M. (1997), ‘Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch’, EJIL, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 566-582. 
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3. In Particular: Services Trade and the Sino-African Angola-Model 
Of particular interest for this paper is the impact of the Angola-Model on the services sector 
and therewith on value-addition on the African continent. Recent trade statistics show 
increasing Sino-African trade: African countries tend to export raw materials to China, while 
importing cheap final products from China34. Given the great interest in and need of 
resources of China35, Sino-African deals with a negative or short-term impact on the local 
African economy are somewhat surprising: There might be ways for the African governments 
to sell their resources in a more value-addition friendly manner to China. One way to do so is 
through the development and fostering of a strong, reliable local or regional services sector36. 
 
3.1 State of Services Trade Liberalisation between China and African Countries 
China has not a single conventional FTA with an African country. Thus, the current state of 
services trade liberalisation is reduced to the general level of liberalisation achieved through 
the GATS:  
Except for the measures listed in the Annex on Article II GATS (exemptions), each 
member of the WTO shall be treated no less favourable than any other member with 
respect to any measure covered by the GATS37.  
Beside the list of exemptions, favourable treatment of a single member is possible through 
entering into an agreement on trade liberalisation in services, which is consistent with the 
requirements imposed by Article V GATS38. However, such agreements do not yet exist 
between African countries and China. Thus, the respective level of trade liberalisation 
                                                 
34 OSEI, B. AND MUBIRU, A. M. (2010), Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa, Policy Brief, 29 July 
2010, African Development Bank, Tunis-Belvedère. 
35 cf. e.g. HANSON, S. (2008), China, Africa and Oil, Report, Council on Foreign Relations, Marshall 
Foundation, Virginia. 
36 cf. CHEN, M-X., GOLDSTEIN, A., PINAUD, N. AND REISEN, H. (2005), China and India: What’s in it for 
Africa?, preliminary draft, OECD Development Centre, Paris. 
37 GATS II. 
38 GATS V(1) requires (a) substantial sectoral coverage, and (b) elimination of substantially all discrimination. 
In the case of South-South Agreements, GATS V(3) provides for more flexibility with regard to the conditions 
set out in GATS V(1). 
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between China and any other African country currently depends on their membership of the 
WTO, and on the GATS commitments entered into by the two states respectively. 
 
There have been negotiations with South Africa about an FTA, which have just recently 
come to a halt. Several impact studies have pointed out that Sino-African trade liberalisation, 
particularly in the services sector, would have a negative impact on the African economy39. 
Of particular relevance in reference to services trade liberalisation is the fact that labour costs 
are so much lower in China than in African countries, and that the Chinese workforce is well-
educated40. Thus, South Africa is not yet able to compete with China’s economies of scale; 
therefore, a conventional FTA is not in the interest of the country41.  
 
When the political establishment of a country like South Africa comes to the conclusion that 
it has not the economic capacity to profit from an FTA with China, it is difficult to imagine 
that any other – less developed – African country would do so, particularly in the services 
sector. Consequently, there are no other FTAs – neither in goods, nor in services – between 
African countries and China currently under negotiations. 
 
3.2 Legal Qualification of the Services Part in the Angola-Model 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, there is evidence pointing towards the public character of 
contracts based on the Angola-Model. To be able to do a thorough and concise analysis, 
access to the legal texts would be required. However, the interesting legal question in this 
                                                 
39 cf. e.g. TULL, D. M. (2006), ‘China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences’, Journal 
of Modern African Studies, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 459-479. 
40 LENNOX, J. (2010), ‘Free Trade with China: A View from the Board Room’, Interview, South African Institute 
of International Affairs [Online], Available: http://www.saiia.org.za/archive-eafrica/free-trade-with-china-a-
view-from-the-board-room.html [Accessed: 2 November 2010]. 
41 cf. LANGENI, L. (2010), ‘South Africa: Free-Trade Agreement With China Not on Cards’, Business Day, 7 
July 2010, bilaterals.org [Online], Available: http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article17695 [Accessed: 2 
November 2010]. 
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context – which can be discussed on a theoretical level – is whether or not the Angola-Model-
contracts are consistent with the provisions of the GATS if the latter applied.  
 
The infrastructure projects and supply of services financed by the China Exim Bank have a 
considerable impact on value-added chains: transportation, telecommunication, technical 
assistance and knowledge-transfer usually lie at the heart of these projects42. However, 
services provided in the exercise of governmental authority – as part of government 
procurement – are outside the scope of GATS43. As the exact scope of the GATS provisions 
on government procurement still remains open for interpretation, there is uncertainty about 
whether or not a particular policy is excluded from MFN.  
 
In addition, due to on-going negotiations on the accession to the Plurilateral Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA) of China, the current legal framework for government 
procurement in China might soon change and new obligations might render past negotiating 
strategies impossible44. The legal framework for government procurement is generally highly 
fragmented and so far only to a small extent regulated on a multilateral level. For instance, 
some African countries have adopted legislative text based on the UNCITRAL model law on 
procurement of goods, construction and services45, some lenders require their own 
procurement plans46, while in some cases no legislation applies at all. However, this legal 
fragmentation is likely to diminish in the coming few years as there are ongoing negotiations 
                                                 
42 FOSTER, V., BUTTERFIELD, W., CHEN, C. AND PUSHAK, N. (2008), Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as 
Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa, The World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 65-81. 
43 GATS XIII, See also: CHANDA, R. (2002), GATS and its Implications for Developing Countries: Key Issues 
and Concerns, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, p. 15. 
44 CHANDA, R. (2002), p. 17-8. 
45 e.g. Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, aso. [Online], Available at: http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model_status.html [Accessed: 5 November 2010] 
46 See African Development Bank [Online], Available at: http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-operations/ 
procurement/resources-for-businesses/procurement-plans/ [Accessed: 5 November 2010] 
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on different levels on a multilateral legal framework for government procurement47. Possibly, 
individual examination of the contracts in the infrastructure and services sector would show 
that not all of them are part of the government procurement, but that some fall under the 
application of the GATS. Given the legal consequences, such an examination is of 
considerable relevance. 
 
The Chinese economic entanglement on the African continent related to the Angola Model is 
multi-fold. Various infrastructure projects listed by the World Bank48 in 2008 seem 
interesting enough for a closer analysis. To name only a few: 
(Niger) Tender for 51% ownership of Sonitel, Niger's state telecoms company, and 
its mobile arm, Sahel Com; Contractor: Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment 
Company Limited (ZTE). 
(DRC) Construction of terminals, tower and power control centre at Ollombo 
Airport; Contractor: China Jiangsu International Economic-Technical Cooperation 
Corporation. 
(Eritrea) Explore and develop minerals in Augaro (Gash-Barka Region); Contractor: 
China National Geological and Mining Corporation. 
In addition to the room for legal interpretation on the GATS application to each of the 
individual contracts, overall trade between African economies and China has increased 
immensely during the past ten years49. This increase of Sino-African trade is part of China’s 
foreign policy and likely linked also to the high number of infrastructure projects and 
contracts attached to loans based on the Angola-Model. Arguably, this increase in trade 
amounts in single sectors and individual countries to de facto preferential market access.  
                                                 
47 e.g. within the WTO, see: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gproc_e.htm [Accessed: 5 November 
2010] 
48 FOSTER, V., BUTTERFIELD, W., CHEN, C. AND PUSHAK, N. (2008), pp. 65-81. 
49 cf. CENTRE FOR CHINESE STUDIES (2008), ‘China and the Democratic Republic of Congo: Partners in 
Development?’, The China Monitor, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, p. 7. 
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Furthermore, it is noteworthy that to the contrary of China other major trading partners of 
African countries – such as the US – base their economic cooperation on a large legal 
framework of different trade and other agreements50. Consequently, examining the level of 
market access attained through Angola-Model based loans, and discussing the legal 
consequences of preferential market access independent from trade agreements would be of 
great interest but exceeds the range of this paper. 
 
3.3 Does the Angola-Model allow more or less Policy-Space than GATS? 
Currently, the Angola-Model certainly allows for more policy-space than would be the case if 
the Sino-African economic cooperation was solely based on GATS commitments. However, 
as there is considerable concern over the legal nature of individual contracts with Chinese 
companies involved in infrastructure projects, and the legal framework governing them, these 
contracts should be very carefully drafted. Also, the accession to the GPA might change the 
overall application of Angola-Model based loans. 
 
In any case, the main concern in the case of the services sector is the requirement to employ 
Chinese companies for the loan. Neither is there, thus, any kind of competition in the 
concerned sectors, nor is it in the interest of sustainable economic growth if the infrastructure 
projects are entirely executed by Chinese companies and their Chinese employees. 
Furthermore, it should be considered whether there is a way to use the Chinese interest in raw 
materials – and also the Chinese commitment to development assistance – to conduct at least 
a first step of value-addition in the respective African country. Relaxing the requirement to 
contract Chinese companies for the infrastructure projects paid by the China Exim Bank’s 
                                                 
50 cf. http://www.bilaterals.org/ [Accessed: 5 November 2010] 
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loan would not only serve local sustainable economic growth and value-addition, but also 
give less reason for concerns over the legality and legal sustainability of such arrangements. 
 
3.4 Does the Angola-Model allow more or less Policy-Space than an FTA in Services? 
Generally, GATS V allows for participation in a free trade agreement, if the agreement 1) 
covers ‘substantially all trade’, 2) removes ‘substantially all discrimination’ between the 
parties of an agreement, and 3) does not raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services 
to service suppliers from countries outside the agreement51. The only way to establish a 
stand-alone sectoral agreement in the area of services consistent with the GATS would be 
through a waiver from the MFN obligation under GATS IX(3). Such waivers must be 
justified by exceptional circumstances, should in principle be temporary, and are subject to 
annual review52. 
 
Given the cheap and well-educated workforce and the modern and experienced services 
sector in China compared with the relatively fragmented services sector in African countries, 
a Sino-African FTA in services would have to be accompanied by a whole range of 
countervailing measures to balance both the short-term turmoil in the services sector and 
impending unemployment of African service suppliers.  
 
However, African economies tend to be in great need of reliable and cheap access to services. 
Economic cooperation in the services sector with China would certainly increase the quality 
and lower the prices in the African services sector. However, a Sino-African FTA in services 
trade would naturally lead to more migration between the two countries and further merge the 
                                                 
51 GATS V. 
52 STEPHENSON, S. M. (2000), ‘Regional Agreements on Services in Multilateral Disciplines: Interpreting and 
Applying GATS Article V’, In: S. M. Stephenson (ed.), Services Trade in the Western Hemisphere: 
Liberalization, Integration, and Reform, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, pp. 86-104, p. 101. 
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two economies. This said and the need for access to finance aside, services sector 
liberalisation would probably be more reasonable on a regional level among different African 
countries, than on a bilateral level with China. 
 
Consequently, the Angola-Model provides also in comparison with a Sino-African FTA in 
service for more policy-space and bears fewer risks for the local economy. Although, services 
trade liberalisation per se would probably support the emergence of regional value-added 
chains as well as foster sustainable economic growth nevertheless. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Given the concerns over the content and legal character of contracts between the China Exim 
Bank, African governments and Chinese companies, there is need for more transparency and 
publicity of the Chinese loans to African countries. Increased transparency would not only be 
of interest to the international community and third countries, but would benefit particularly 
the people concerned as these contracts essentially deal with public goods.  
 
As has been outlined and discussed in this paper, depending on the legal character of 
contracts with Chinese companies, the implications for the content and consistency with the 
body of international economic law differ greatly. In addition, it is questionable whether 
these side-agreements really support development in African countries, because of the strict 
concession to hire Chinese companies and employees for the projects financed by the 
Chinese loan. 
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Furthermore, due to the pending accession of China to the GPA, and ongoing negotiations 
over a multilateral legal framework on government procurement, the Angola-Model based 
loans to African countries will have to be re-examined in any case: They are not consistent 
with the requirements imposed by the GPA to date. Therefore, the discussed room for policy 
and negotiation for African governments related to the different legal instruments of 
international economic cooperation and integration could be of interest for future negotiations 
over Sino-African state loans. 
 
Finally, this paper has pointed out the need for further examination into China’s de facto 
market access to the African market, and the legal consequences of such market access 
completely detached from conventional trade agreements. 
 
